For searching keywords against encrypted data, the public key encryption scheme with keyword search (PEKS), and its an extension called secure-channel free PEKS (SCF-PEKS) have been proposed. In SCF-PEKS, a receiver makes a trapdoor for a keyword, and uploads it on a server. A sender computes an encrypted keyword, and sends it to the server. The server executes the searching procedure (called the test algorithm, which takes as inputs an encrypted keyword, trapdoor, and secret key of the server). In this paper, we extend the security of SCF-PEKS, calling it adaptive SCF-PEKS, wherein an adversary (modeled as a "malicious-but-legitimate" receiver) is allowed to issue test queries adaptively, and show that adaptive SCF-PEKS can be generically constructed by anonymous identity-based encryption (anonymous IBE) only. That is, for constructing adaptive SCF-PEKS we need not require any additional cryptographic primitive when compared to the Abdalla et al. PEKS construction (J. Cryptology 2008), even though adaptive SCF-PEKS requires additional functionalities. Note that our generic construction needs to apply the KEM/DEM framework (a.k.a. hybrid encryption), where KEM stands for key encapsulation mechanism, and DEM stands for data encapsulation mechanism. We also show that there is a class of anonymous IBE that can be applied for constructing adaptive SCF-PEKS without using hybrid encryption, and propose an adaptive SCF-PEKS construction based on this IBE. Although our second construction is not fully generic, it is efficient compared to the first, since we can exclude the DEM part. Finally, we instantiate an adaptive SCF-PEKS scheme (via our second construction) that achieves a similar level of efficiency for the costs of the test procedure and encryption, compared to the (non-adaptive secure) SCF-PEKS scheme by Fang et al. (CANS2009).
sender makes a ciphertext of a keyword ω ′ by using the receiver's public key, and sends it to the server. The server outputs 1 if ω = ω ′ , by using t ω , and 0 otherwise. PEKS was investigated from both theoretical and practical perspectives. For example, several PEKS schemes with additional functionality have been proposed thus far: PEKS schemes treating plural keywords [11, 30, 37, 42] , PEKS with public key encryption (PEKS/PKE) [3, 45] , a decryptable PEKS scheme [24] , where a receiver can decrypt an encrypted keyword, and a public key encryption with an oblivious keyword search scheme [14] , wherein the server can obtain trapdoors without revealing the keywords. From the theoretical perspective, a PEKS scheme based on Jacobi symbols has been proposed [17] (though almost all PEKS schemes are constructed by using bilinear maps). The off-line keyword guessing attack was also introduced in [13, 31, 39, 44] , wherein an adversary can guess what keywords were used for computing trapdoors. The notion of interactive PEKS, wherein the trapdoor is generated interactively by the sender and the receiver, has also been proposed [16] . Moreover, PEKS with perfect keyword privacy has been considered in [36] which treats the leakage of keywords from trapdoors.
As a feasibility result of PEKS, Abdalla et al. [1] showed that a generic construction of PEKS based on anonymous IBE is sufficient.
Security Conditions of Previous Secure-Channel Free PEKS (SCF-PEKS) Schemes and the Theoretic Extension
PEKS schemes ensure that the server (or an outsider) learns nothing about keywords chosen by the sender without trapdoor information. Namely, if trapdoors are revealed, then anyone can execute the test procedure. Therefore, trapdoors cannot be sent via public (i.e., insecure) channels. So, in PEKS schemes, a secure channel (such as secure socket layer (SSL) and transport layer security (TLS)) between a receiver and a server is required, and establishing the channel requires additional setup costs. To solve this problem, secure-channel free PEKS (SCF-PEKS) has been proposed [4, 22, 27, 28, 32] , wherein the server has a public/secret key pair, and the sender makes a ciphertext of a keyword ω ′ (which is encrypted by the server's public key and the receiver's public key), and sends it to the server. The server outputs 1 if ω = ω ′ by using the trapdoor t ω and its own secret key, and 0 otherwise. Even if t ω is sent via an insecure channel, no entity (except the server) can run the test procedure.
Next, we discuss the security conditions of the previous SCF-PEKS. The security models of the previous SCF-PEKS schemes [4, 22, 27, 28, 32] do not capture the test queries (i.e., no adversary can issue test queries in security games). We point out that this definition does not capture the real environment as follows. A malicious receiver computes (or eavesdrops on) a trapdoor, and uploads it to the server.
• From the viewpoint of the server, this is the same as uploading a trapdoor from a valid receiver.
2. The malicious receiver computes (or eavesdrops on) an SCF-PEKS ciphertext, and sends it to the server.
• This is the same as sending a ciphertext from a valid sender.
3. The malicious receiver can obtain the result of the test algorithm.
Through the above procedure, the malicious receiver can obtain the result of the test algorithm. In other words, the malicious receiver can use the server as the test oracle. SCF-PEKS therefore has to be secure, even if the malicious receiver can be admitted to issue test queries. The test queries were considered in [38] , but this definition is still weak (i.e., "Unquoted CCA-like" security [35] ) be the trapdoors corresponding to the challenge keyword ω * 0 (resp. ω * 1 ). In the definition of [38] , A is allowed to
. This is not natural, since A may compute a ciphertext λ and replace a part of λ with a part of λ * . This scenario can easily be handled in the above real world example by sending such a "replaced ciphertext" in the guess phase. By considering the CCA2 security, SCF-PEKS must be secure even if a "malicious-but-legitimate" receiver can be admitted to issue test queries adaptively. We insist that this adaptive (i.e., "CCA2-like") security is theoretically the natural extension of the SCF-PEKS security, which is called adaptive SCF-PEKS.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a generic construction of adaptive SCF-PEKS based on anonymous IBE, selectivetag chosen-ciphertext (IND-stag-CCA) secure tag-based encryption (TBE), and strongly existentially unforgeable (sUF) OTS. This is the first generic construction of SCF-PEKS. Note that IND-stag-CCA-secure TBE can be constructed by selective-ID chosen plaintext (sID-CPA) secure IBE [33] , and the digital signature can be constructed by IBE [18] . Therefore, our result shows that adaptive SCF-PEKS can be constructed by anonymous IBE only. That is, we show that for constructing adaptive SCF-PEKS no additional cryptographic primitive is required when compared to the Abdalla et al. PEKS construction [1] , even though adaptive SCF-PEKS requires additional functionalities. This construction uses double encryption, wherein TBE encrypts a ciphertext of an anonymous IBE. Since the ciphertext space of IBE is usually not equal to the plaintext space of TBE, we apply the KEM/DEM framework [41] (a.k.a. hybrid encryption), where KEM stands for key encapsulation mechanism, and DEM stands for data encapsulation mechanism.
Next, we show that there is a class of anonymous IBE that can be applied for constructing adaptive SCF-PEKS without using hybrid encryption, and propose an adaptive SCF-PEKS construction based on such an IBE. Although it is not fully generic, our second construction is efficient compared to the first one since we can exclude the DEM part.
Finally, we instantiate an adaptive SCF-PEKS scheme based on the Gentry anonymous IBE scheme [25] , the Kiltz IND-stag-CCA-secure TBE scheme [33] , and the Bellare-Shoup sUF OTS scheme [7] , by using our second adaptive SCF-PEKS construction. Our concrete adaptive SCF-PEKS construction (called the GKBS construction due to the author's name) achieves a similar level of efficiency for the costs of the test procedure and encryption, compared to the (non-adaptive secure) SCF-PEKS scheme without random oracles proposed by Fang et al [22] (see the comparison table (Table 2 ) in section 6.3).
Remark. Independent of our result, very recently, Fang et al. [23] proposed a concrete SCF-PEKS scheme with keyword guessing attack resilience. They also considered the test oracle, and give a formal security definition. The efficiency of our concrete instantiation (GKBS) and that of the Fang et al. SCF-PEKS scheme is almost similar. Note that no generic construction is given in [23] , and therefore proposing a generic construction of adaptive SCF-PEKS with keyword guessing attack resilience is an interesting future work.
Figure 2: TBE Experiment
IND-stag-CCA Exp IND-stag-CCA Π,A (1 κ ) := [ (t * , State) ← A(1 κ ); (pk, sk) ← TBE.KeyGen(1 κ ); (M * 0 , M * 1 , State) ← A DEC (find, pk, State); µ $ ← {0, 1}; C * T BE ← TBE.Enc(pk, t * , M * µ ); µ ′ ← A DEC (guess, C * , State); µ = µ ′ ]
Preliminaries
This section, we define the building tools for our generic adaptive SCF-PEKS construction. x $ ← S means that x is chosen uniformly from a set S. y←A(x) means that y is an output of an algorithm A under an input x. We denote State as the state information transmitted by the adversary to himself across stages of the attack in experiments.
Definitions of IND-stag-CCA Secure TBE
In the following, T AG and M T BE are a tag space of TBE and a plaintext space of TBE, respectively.
Definition 2.1 (Syntax of TBE).
A TBE scheme [33] Figure 2 , and define the advantage of A Adv
Here, DEC is the decryption oracle for any tag t ̸ = t * , where for input of a ciphertext Figure 3 , and define the advantage of A Adv (1 
it returns the result of the test algorithm.
Definitions of sUF OTS
In the following, M Sig is a message space of OTS.
Definition 2.7 (Syntax of OTS).
A strongly existentially unforgeable (sUF) OTS against adaptively chosen message attack (CMA) (e.g., [7] ) consists of the following three algorithms, Sig.KeyGen, Sign and Verify:
This algorithm takes as an input a security parameter 1 κ (κ ∈ N), and returns a signing/verification key pair
(K s , K v ).
Sign(K s , M ) : This algorithm takes as inputs K s and a message M ∈ M Sig , and returns a signature σ.

Verify(K v , σ, M ) : This algorithm takes as inputs K v , σ, and M , and returns 1 if σ is a valid signature of
M , and 0 otherwise. (1 κ ) as follows.
Correctness is defined as follows: For all (K
A signature scheme Π is said to be one-time sUF-CMA secure if the advantage Adv
Definitions of Adaptive SCF-PEKS
In this section, we define security requirements of SCF-PEKS. In the following, K is a keyword space. , and returns a server public key pk S and a server secret key sk S .
Figure 5: SCF-PEKS Experiments
Consistency
This server key generation algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1
, and returns a receiver public key pk R and a receiver secret key sk R .
SCF-PEKS.Trapdoor(sk R , ω) : This trapdoor generation algorithm takes as input sk R and a keyword ω ∈ K,
and returns a trapdoor t ω corresponding to keyword ω. A sender makes a ciphertext λ of a keyword ω ′ using both pk S and pk R , and sends λ to the server. The server runs SCF-PEKS.Test(λ, sk S , t ω ), whose output is 1 if ω = ω ′ , and 0 otherwise. We require the correctness property as follows: For all (pk S , sk
SCF-PEKS.Enc(pk S , pk R , ω) : This encryption algorithm takes as input pk
, and all ω ∈ K, SCF-PEKS.Test(λ, sk S , t ω ) = 1 holds, where λ ← SCF-PEKS.Enc(pk R , pk S , ω) and t ω ← SCF-PEKS.Trapdoor(sk R , ω).
Next, we consider two security requirements "consistency" and "keyword privacy". Figure 5 , and define the advantage of A Adv
Definition 3.2 (Consistency). For any PPT adversary A and the security parameter κ ∈ N, we define the experiment Exp
SCF-PEKS-CONSIST
The SCF-PEKS scheme Π is said to be computationally consistent if the advantage Adv
Next, we define two security notions for keyword privacy, "indistinguishability against chosen keyword attack with the server's secret key" (IND-CKA-SSK for short) and "indistinguishability against chosen keyword attack with all trapdoors" (IND-CKA-AT for short). In the IND-CKA-SSK experiment, an adversary A is assumed to be a malicious server. Therefore, A is given the server's secret key sk S , whereas A cannot obtain the receiver's secret key sk R . Instead of obtaining sk R , A can issue a query to a trapdoor oracle T RAP, which is defined in Table 1 . As in the definition of [38] , A computes (pk S , sk S ), and gives pk S to the challenger. So, we omit sk S in the IND-CKA-SSK experiment. Figure 5 , and define Adv
Definition 3.3 (IND-CKA-SSK). For any PPT adversary A and the security parameter κ ∈ N, we define the experiment Exp
An SCF-PEKS scheme Π is said to be IND-CKA-SSK-secure if the advantage Adv
Remark: Note that, for our TRE construction, the adversarial server's key generation above is not required. That is, the weaker definition can be used, where C can run (pk S , sk S ) ← SCF-PEKS.KeyGen S (1 κ ), and sends (pk S , sk S ) to A in our proof of Theorem 2.
Next, we define the adaptive-IND-CKA-AT experiment. In this experiment, an adversary A is assumed to be a malicious-but-legitimate receiver or outsider. Therefore, A is given the receiver's secret key sk R , whereas A cannot obtain the server's secret key sk S . This means that A knows all trapdoors. A can issue a query to a test oracle T EST , which is defined in Table 1 . As in the definition of [38] , A computes (pk R , sk R ), and gives pk R to the challenger. So, we omit sk R in the Adaptive-IND-CKA-AT experiment. Figure 5 , and define Adv
Definition 3.4 (Adaptive-IND-CKA-AT). For any PPT adversary A and the security parameter κ ∈ N, we define the experiment Exp
Adaptive-IND-CKA-AT Π,A (1 κ ) inAdaptive-IND-CKA-AT Π,A (1 κ ) as follows. Adv Adaptive-IND-CKA-AT Π,A (1 κ ) = Pr [ Exp Adaptive-IND-CKA-AT Π,A (1 κ ) ] − 1 2
An SCF-PEKS scheme is said to be adaptive-IND-CKA-AT-secure if the advantage is negligible for any PPT adversary A in the following experiment.
Remark: As in the IND-CKA-SSK, for TRE construction, the adversarial receiver's key generation above is not required. That is, we use the weaker definition, where C can run (pk R , sk R ) ← SCF-PEKS.KeyGen R (1 κ ), and sends (pk R , sk R ) to A in our proof of Theorem 1.
Anonymous IBE Implies Adaptive SCF-PEKS
A Generic Construction of Adaptive SCF-PEKS
This section gives a generic construction of adaptive SCF-PEKS based on anonymous IBE, IND-stag-CCA TBE, and sUF OTS. In our construction, a ciphertext of an anonymous IBE scheme (say C IBE ) is used as a "plaintext" of a TBE scheme to hide keyword information from an adversary. From the result of the decryption of the TBE scheme, the ciphertext C IBE must be obtained. In addition, usually, C IBE ̸ ∈ M T BE . To handle this condition, we apply the KEM/DEM framework [41] (a.k.a. hybrid encryption), where KEM stands for key encapsulation mechanism, and DEM stands for data encapsulation mechanism. By using TBE KEM (see section 6 of [33] ), compute (K, C T BE ) ← TBE.Enc(pk, t), and encrypt C IBE as a plaintext of the CCA secure DEM such that e = E K (C IBE ). Note that a CCA-secure DEM can be generically constructed from any pseudorandom functions without redundancy [34] . So, even if we assume that a CCA secure DEM exists, we need no additional cryptographic primitive, except anonymous IBE, for constructing adaptive SCF-PEKS. From here, we assume that C IBE ∈ M T BE and e = E K (C IBE ) is implicitly included in C T BE (i.e., C IBE is obtained from the decryption of C T BE ). Note that section 5 gives an extended construction (which does not require hybrid encryption).
In the following construction, as in the Abdalla et al. PEKS construction [1] , a keyword ω is regarded as an "identity" of IBE. As in the Kiltz CCA-secure PKE construction [33] based on IND-stag-CCA TBE, a verification key K v is regarded as a "tag" of TBE. We use a target collision-resistant (TCR) hash function [6] 
SCF-PEKS.Enc(pk
, and 0 otherwise.
Obviously, correctness holds if the underlying TBE, IBE, and OTS satisfy correctness.
Intuitively, an adversary (in the IND-CKA-SSK experiment) that has the server's secret key (i.e., a decryption key of TBE) can compute C IBE from C T BE . However, since such an adversary does not have trapdoors to the challenge keywords, no information about keywords leaks from a ciphertext of an anonymous IBE, even if R is revealed from σ (without contradicting unforgeable property). In other words, we can reduce from the IND-CKA-SSK experiment to the IBE-ANO-CPA experiment. TBE is applied to hide information about keywords from an adversary (in the adaptive-IND-CKA-AT experiment) that has all the trapdoors. In other words, the adversary loses the opportunity to apply trapdoors to challenge keywords to the challenge ciphertext. In addition, due to the sUF property of the underlying signature scheme and the TCR property of H tag , the adversary cannot issue a test query that the simulator cannot answer. Non-adaptive SCF-PEKS construction: By observing our construction, a non-adaptive SCF-PEKS (i.e., IND-CKA-AT without test queries, which has the same security requirement as Fang et al. [22] ) can be constructed by reducing the one-time signature part and replacing the TBE part with CPA-secure PKE (i.e., chosen plaintext security is enough). A ciphertext is (C P KE , R), where C IBE ← IBE.Enc(pk R , ω, R) and C P KE ← PKE.Enc(pk S , C IBE ). As in our adaptive SCF-PEKS construction, we assume that C IBE ∈ M P KE , where M P KE is the message space of the underlying PKE scheme. The test procedure is described as follows. 
Security Analysis of our First Adaptive SCF-PEKS construction
Theorem 4.2. The SCF-PEKS scheme constructed by our method is IND-CKA-SSK secure if the underlying IBE scheme is IBE-ANO-CPA secure.
Proof. Let A be an adversary who breaks the IND-CKA-SSK security of SCF-PEKS constructed by the protocol 1, and C be the challenger of the IBE-ANO-CPA experiment. Then we can construct an algorithm B that breaks the IBE-ANO-CPA security of the underlying IBE scheme. First, C runs IBE.Setup(1 κ ), and gives pk to B. B sets pk as pk R . A runs (pk S , sk S ) ← TBE.KeyGen(1 κ ), and gives pk S to B. For a T RAP query ω i , B forwards ω i to C as an EX T RACT query of the IBE scheme, gets t ωi , and answers t ωi to A. t ̸ = t * : B can use the DEC oracle of the underlying TBE scheme as follows.
In the
B forwards (C T BE , t)
to C as a DEC query of the TBE scheme.
C answers C ′
IBE ← TBE.Dec(sk, t, C T BE ).
• Note that if t is not the legitimate tag of C T BE , then C answers ⊥. In this case, B answers 0.
B computes R
′ )) = 1, then B returns 1, and 0 otherwise. 
is not a valid signature pair, then B ′ returns 0 as the answer of this T EST query. Otherwise, if ((C T BE , R ′ ), σ) is a valid signature pair, then B ′ submits a forged pair ((C T BE , R ′ ), σ) to the sUF challenger and wins. 
IBE with Partitioned Ciphertext Structure (PCS-IBE)
The role of the KEM/DEM framework in the first adaptive SCF-PEKS construction (presented in section 4) is that an IBE ciphertext is regarded as a TBE plaintext to hide keyword information from an adversary that has mk (this adversary appears in the Adaptive-IND-CKA-AT experiment). In this section, we propose an extension of the first SCF-PEKS construction, which need not require hybrid encryption. Unfortunately, we assume that the underlying IBE belongs a special class, however, while previously known pairing-based anonymous IBE schemes [10, 12, 14, 15, 19, 25, 40] belong to this class. In other words, we do not have to apply hybrid encryption as long as a previously known anonymous IBE scheme (enumerated in the above list) is used as a building tool of adaptive SCF-PEKS. Here, we show that the KEM/DEM framework can be reduced if the underlying IBE satisfies the following properties (called IBE with partitioned ciphertext structure (PCS-IBE) 1 ).
Definition 4.1 (PCS-IBE). IBE is said to be PCS-IBE if its ciphertext C IBE can be split into two parts
) with the following properties.
• C IBE,1 is a single group element.
-Note that the essential condition is C IBE,1 ∈ M T BE . However, since Kiltz [33] proposed a TBE scheme with M T BE = G and M T BE = G T , respectively, where (G, G T ) is a bilinear group, it is enough to require that C IBE,1 is a single group element.
• C IBE,1 only includes an identity ID (i.e., C IBE,2 is independent of ID).
• For any common message M and distinct identities ID and
if the same random number s is used for both encryptions.
This structure is used for computing the challenge ciphertext in the proof of the adaptive IND-CKA-AT. In the proof, no matter which plaintext (C 0,IBE,1 , C 1,IBE,1 ) is encrypted, both C 0,IBE,2 and C 1,IBE,2 can be used as a part of the challenge ciphertext, since C 0,IBE,2 = C 1,IBE,2 due to the PCS property.
Here, we explain the above structure in the Boneh-Franklin (BF) IBE scheme [10] case due to its easyto-understand structure as follows: For a message M and an identity ID, a ciphertext ( Hash(ID) s ) and C IBE,2 = g s , where Y is a public key of the key authority, and s ∈ Z p (with a prime order p) is a random number of an encryptor's choice. Then, for the common message M , an another identity ID ′ , and the same random number s,
In the Gentry IBE case (which is used for our instantiations), for a message M and an identity ID, a ciphertext (
. So, for the common message M , an another identity ID ′ , and the same random number s,
The Second Adaptive SCF-PEKS Construction based on PCS-IBE
Although SCF-PEKS.KeyGen S , SCF-PEKS.KeyGen R , and SCF-PEKS.Trapdoor are the same as these of the first adaptive SCF-PEKS construction (protocol 2), for the sake of clarity, we descrbe these algorithms in the following. Let a ciphertext space of the underlying PCS-IBE be
Protocol 4.2 (Our Second Adaptive SCF-PEKS Construction w/o Hybrid Encryption).
SCF-PEKS.KeyGen
, and output (pk S , sk S ).
, and output (pk R , sk R ).
SCF-PEKS.Trapdoor(sk R , ω):
Run t ω ← IBE.Extract(sk R , ω), and output t ω . (pk S , t, C IBE,1 ) , and σ ← Sign(K s , (C IBE,2 , C T BE , R) ), and output λ = (C IBE,2 , C T BE , K v , σ) .
SCF-PEKS.Enc(pk
The security proofs are the same as the first ones, except the construction of the challenge ciphertext in the adaptive-IND-CKA-AT experiment as follows: In the Challenge phase, B needs to compute the SCF-PEKS challenge ciphertext λ * , although B does not know µ ∈ {0, 1} chosen by the TBE challenger C. So, our PCS property comes into effect to compute λ * , since B can use both C 0,IBE,2 and C 1,IBE,2 (so we set C * IBE,2 = C 0,IBE,2 ). More concretely, in the Challenge phase, A sends the challenge keywords ω * 0 and ω * 1 to B, B chooses R * $ ← M IBE , and computes the challenge ciphertext as follows:
* ) using the same random number (i.e., C 0,IBE,2 = C 1,IBE,2 ). B sets C * IBE,2 := C 0,IBE,2 .
• Note that both (C 0,IBE,1 , C * IBE,2 ) and (C 1,IBE,1 , C * IBE,2 ) are valid ciphertexts of the underlying IBE scheme. This is the reason we require anonymous "PCS"-IBE. Then, λ * is a valid ciphertext due to the PCS property. Since B does not have to consider the bit µ chosen by C, B can use C * IBE,2 . As in the first one, non-adaptive SCF-PEKS can be constructed by reducing the one-time signature part and replacing the TBE part with CPA-secure PKE. Let the underlying IBE be PCS, then a ciphertext is (C IBE,2 , C P KE , R), where (C IBE,1 , C IBE,2 ) ← IBE.Enc(pk R , ω, R) and C P KE ← PKE.Enc(pk S , C IBE,1 ).
Comparison Between Our First/Second Adaptive SCF-PEKS Constructions
In the first adaptive SCF-PEKS construction (protocol 1, section 4), the DEM part e = E k (C IBE ) is implicitly included in C T BE . Here, we explicitly include e in a SCF-PEKS ciphertext as follows:
(subscript 1 means that it is a ciphertext of the first adaptive SCF-PEKS construction). On the contrary,
in the second SCF-PEKS construction (proposed in this section, protocol 2, subscript 2 means that it is a ciphertetxt of the second adaptive SCF-PEKS construction). Since the size of e is at least the same size of C IBE , by excluding the DEM part, the size of the ciphertext of the second construction (say |λ 2 |) is smaller than that of the first one (say |λ 1 |): i.e., |λ 1 | ≥ |C IBE,1 | + |λ 2 |. Since the ciphertext size is the most bottlenecked point of our adaptive SCF-PEKS construction compared to the concrete constructions, we can say that the second adaptive SCF-PEKS construction is more efficient than the first, though it is not fully generic. [22] 2M
5 A Concrete Instantiation of Adaptive SCF-PEKS
The GKBS Construction
Here, by using the extended version of our adaptive SCF-PEKS construction, we instantiate an adaptive SCF-PEKS scheme based on the Gentry (PCS) anonymous IBE [25] , the Kiltz IND-stag-CCA-secure TBE [33] , and the Bellare-Shoup sUF one-time signature [7] . We call it the GKBS construction by picking up the authors name. Let G and G T be cyclic groups of prime order p, e be an efficiently computable bilinear map e : G × G → G T , and H sig : {0, 1} κ × {0, 1} * → Z p be a CR hash function, where each κ-bit key K specifies a particular hash function H(K, ·) with domain {0, 1}
* . We assume that e(g, g) and e(g, h) are included in public keys to reduce pairing computations.
Protocol 5.1. An adaptive SCF-PEKS scheme without random oracles (the GKBS construction)
) .
SCF-PEKS.KeyGen
We assume the difficulty of the one-more-discrete-log (omdl) problem [5] 2 , the decisional augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent (decisional ABDHE) problem [25] , and the gap decision linear (gap DLIN) problem [33] , and the collision resistance of H tag and H sig . Then, the above SCF-PEKS instantiation is adaptive secure in the standard model. Next, we estimate the efficiency of the GKBS construction. Although concrete SCF-PEKS schemes have been proposed [4, 27, 28, 38] , these schemes are proved in the random oracle model. As a well-known fact, efficient cryptographic schemes can be constructed easily if the random oracle is assumed. So, we focus on SCF-PEKS schemes proposed by Fang et al. [22] and Khader [32] , respectively, which are secure in the standard model. Khader [32] shows that PEKS and SCF-PEKS can be constructed by using k-resilient IBE [29] (which is an IBE scheme, wherein an adversary can obtain at most k private keys of IDs). Since k-resilient IBE [29] is designed by applying a DDH-hard group without pairings, the Khader PEKS/SCF-PEKS also enables pairing-free constructions. Unfortunately, the Khader PEKS/SCF-PEKS schemes require k-dependent large number of public keys and high encryption costs. Therefore, here we compare our GKBS construction to the Fang et al. SCF-PEKS scheme [22] in Table 2 (the Fang et al. SCF-PEKS scheme is introduced in the Appendix). In addition, for comparison, we instantiate a non-adaptive SCF-PEKS scheme (using the second construction). We call this the GBBS construction which is based on the Gentry IBE scheme [25] and the linear encryption scheme presented by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [8] (the actual construction of this non-adaptive SCF-PEKS scheme is given in the Appendix). The GBBS construction achieves the same security level as that of the Fang et al. construction.
Let M E(G) and M E(G T ) be the computational costs of multi-exponentiation in G and G T , respectively, BM be that of one bilinear map computation, and |G|, |G T |, and |Z p | be the bit-length of the representation of an element of G, G T , and Z p , respectively. More precisely, we assume that the security parameter κ = 170. Therefore, p is a 170-bit prime, |G| = 171 bits and |G T | = 1020 bits: i.e., we assume that G is an elliptic curve defined over finite field F p and G T is a multiplicative group on finite field F × p k with the embedded degree k = 6. In this case, the computational complexity over G T is approximately three times higher than that of G. So, we estimate M E(G T ) = 3M E(G), and write them in Table 2 in parentheses. Although in the GKBS construction the length of the ciphertext is larger than that of the Fang et al. construction, the computation of the Test algorithm is faster (if BM < M E(G) which usually holds). Therefore, there is not much efficiency difference between our GKBS construction and the Fang et al. scheme, although the GKBS construction enables adaptive security.
Conclusion
In this paper, from a theoretical perspective, we show that no additional cryptographic primitive is required compared to the Abdalla et al. PEKS construction, even though adaptive SCF-PEKS requires additional functionalities.
From a practical perspective, since malicious receivers can use the server as the test oracle, our adaptive security notion is applicable in practice. In addition, our concrete adaptive SCF-PEKS construction (the GKBS construction) achieves a similar level of efficiency for the costs of the test procedure and encryption, compared to the (non-adaptive secure) SCF-PEKS scheme without random oracles proposed by Fang et al, even though adaptive SCF-PEKS requires additional functionalities. , and outputs 1 if the answer to this query is 1, and 0 otherwise. We should notice that this attack is positioned in outside of their security models.
Appendix.B
Here, we instantiate a non-adaptive SCF-PEKS based on the Gentry (PCS) anonymous IBE [25] and linear encryption presented by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham [8] . We assume that e(g, g) and e(g, h) are included in public keys to reduce pairing computations. ), and outputs 1 if the answer to this query is 1, and 0 otherwise. To avoid such an attack, TBE and OTS are required in our adaptive SCF-PEKS constructions.
